



# *The President's Daily Brief*

*10 July 1971*

*47*

50X1

~~Top Secret~~

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF**

10 July 1971

**PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Peking is showing no flexibility on the UN representation issue, and backers of the Albanian resolution are planning to inscribe it on the UN agenda [redacted]

50X1  
50X1

[redacted] (Page 1)

Photography shows many permanent facilities on the Chinese side of the border near disputed Chen-pao Island. (Page 2)

Cambodia is seeking rice from the US and elsewhere in response to public pressure. (Page 3)

A Romanian party directive calling for intensified orthodoxy seems linked to uncertainties over relations with Moscow (Page 4), while the Yugoslavs are making some overtures to the West in view of similar concerns. (Page 5)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CHINA-UN

[redacted] cosponsors of the Albanian resolution calling for the seating of Peking and the expulsion of Taipei indicate there will be no flexibility in Peking's position. The group decided in addition to seek more cosponsors and to inscribe the resolution on the UN agenda [redacted]. The Albanian chairman, apparently relaying Peking's instructions, rejected a proposal to conduct an intense lobbying effort against the Important Question resolution, presumably on the grounds that this stands little chance of passage in the coming session.

50X1


50X1

[redacted] a Japanese UN representative told US officers there that Tokyo's soundings on various "dual representation" resolutions had shown that such a motion is unlikely to pass. There are indications that several other countries interested in preserving Taipei's seat in the General Assembly are equally gloomy.

50X1

*The inflexibility of Peking and its supporters has clearly reinforced the initial pessimism of many countries over the chances of an alternative to the traditional Chinese representation motions. In any event, support for Taipei has steadily eroded since last year's vote, and further slippage prior to next autumn's vote is a virtual certainty.*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR**

A large number of permanent military facilities on the Chinese side of the border near disputed Chen-pao (Damanskiy) Island have been seen in recent satellite photography. There are as many as 400 small buildings, numerous bunkers, vehicle revetments, and antiaircraft and artillery positions within 11 miles of the island, in addition to five helicopter pads.

Most of these facilities were built during 1968 and 1969 but could not be clearly identified in photography of that time. Chinese forces near the border were reinforced following armed conflict over boundary delineation in March 1969. They now maintain a permanent presence in support of their claim to Chen-pao. Photography since the clash showed that the Chinese had established defensive positions on the island; whether these facilities are currently occupied cannot be determined in the recent film.

The Soviets maintain well-equipped border guard units close to Chen-pao, and have at least four divisions within 100 miles of the island.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**CAMBODIA**

The government is under considerable public pressure to ease the country's serious shortage of rice and has formally requested the immediate shipment of 32,000 tons of US rice under the PL-480 program and the shipment of 150,000 tons after June 1972. Phnom Penh is also trying to buy rice from Tokyo and Taipei.

*The US Embassy believes that at present consumption levels current stocks will be exhausted by mid-November. Merchants, however, tend to conceal the size of their rice holdings, and official figures on the amounts in private hands are likely to be underestimated. The removal of price ceilings in Phnom Penh, which the government is considering, might shake loose enough privately held rice to carry Cambodia through into the next harvest beginning in January. In addition, armed convoys are making a major effort to transport large amounts of rice on a daily basis from Battambang Province.*

*With regard to next year's needs, the size of plantings in Battambang is said to be well behind schedule because of early flooding, labor shortages, and lack of incentives stemming from relatively low prices for paddy rice.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**ROMANIA-USSR**

*The Communist Party's call on Wednesday for intensification of ideological and cultural orthodoxy appears to stem from uncertainty over relations with Moscow following Ceausescu's recent Asian tour. The new directive comes down particularly hard on Romanian youth, some of whom are termed "parasites." The statement is more dogmatic and regressive than a similar directive issued last February, when on the surface at least Bucharest's relations with Moscow appeared to be moving toward an acceptable modus vivendi.*

*Since neither youth nor intellectuals represent a threat to Romania's internal stability, the new directive seems designed to remove grounds for any Soviet questioning of Ceausescu's commitment to Communism. The Bucharest press continues to publish endorsements of the tour in a manner intended to demonstrate firm Romanian popular support of Ceausescu. More expressions of solidarity can be expected as Bucharest holds out against participation in Warsaw Pact exercises in Bulgaria later this summer.*

*A desire to avoid saying anything that might even indirectly further disturb Moscow may account also for the reluctance of Romanian officials to discuss details of Ceausescu's travels with Western diplomats.*

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**YUGOSLAVIA**

Belgrade has recently been mounting a low-keyed effort both at home and abroad to deal with the possibility of an increase in Soviet pressure. Always suspicious of Moscow, Tito is concerned over his repeated failure to reach a post-Czechoslovakia understanding that would defuse the threat of the Brezhnev doctrine. Plans for Warsaw Pact military exercises in Bulgaria have further stirred Yugoslavia's long-range suspicions of Soviet intentions.

50X1  
50X1

50X1

In the past few weeks, along with cultivating warmer state relations toward Peking, Belgrade has made several bids for military cooperation with NATO members. In late June a deputy defense minister broached the possibility of expanded military ties with the US, including arms purchases.

50X1

The Yugoslavs have also suggested the possibility of a joint defense of the Adriatic.

50X1

Tito realizes that such overtures risk further antagonizing Moscow, but evidently feels that a package of real and symbolic deterrents will have some value.

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

**NOTE**

East-West Germany: The Honecker regime, in a concrete move to underline its contention that West Germany is a foreign country, has abolished its State Secretariat for West German Affairs.

50X1  
50X1

[redacted] questions regarding West Germany are now to be handled by the Foreign Ministry. It is unclear whether the Foreign Ministry will assume responsibility for West German affairs immediately or after the current series of East-West German talks has concluded.

50X1

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**

*Top Secret*